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Law and Language: An Historical and Critical Introduction t
PETER GOODRICH*

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the glaringly obvious fact that both legal theory and legal practice
are, and have always been, heavily dependent upon the tools of rhetorical
and linguistic analysis, no coherent or systematic account of the relationship of law to language has ever been achieved. Even worse, the occasional
exercises that modern jurisprudence has conducted in the direction of
normative linguistics, in studying the "grammar" of law, or the philosophy
of ordinary language, in outlining the semantics of rule application, have
been exercises aimed at asserting or defending the positivistic view that law
is an internally defined "system" of notional meanings or legal values, that
it is a technical language and is by and large, unproblematically, univocal in
its application. Despite the linguistically dubious nature of the assumptions
regularly made by formalistic theories of adjudication, lawyers and legal
theorists have successfully maintained a superb oblivion to the historical
and social features of legal language and, rather than studying the actual
development of legal linguistic practice, have asserted deductive models of
law application in which language is the neutral instrument of purposes
peculiar to the internal development of legal regulation and legal discipline. What has been consistently excluded from the ambit of legal studies
has been the possibility of analysing law as a specific stratification or
"register" of an actually existent language system, together with the correlative denial of the heuristic value of analysing legal texts themselves as
historical products organised according to rhetorical criteria. Despite the
common social experience of legal regulation as a profoundly alien linguistic practice, as control by means of an archaic, obscure, professionalised
and impenetrable language, no recognition has been provided of the peculiar and distinctive character of law as a specific, sociolinguistically defined
speech community and usage. The critical aims of the present introductory
article will be those of endeavouring to develop an awareness of the
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linguistic problems inherent in viewing law as a system of communication
and of non-communication , as the rhetoric of a particular group or class,
and as a specific exercise of power and power over meaning. In view of
such aims, I will assume that legal language , like any other language usage,
is a social practice and that its texts will bear the imprint of such practice or
organisational background, and further , that as a discourse or genre , legal
discourse, is inevitably answerable to or responsible for its place and role
within the political and sexual commitments of its times .
That there is as yet no sub-division of the legal genre that studies law and
language in a manner comparable to the jurisprudential and socio-legal
disciplines devoted to law " and" economics , anthropology, sociology ,
psychology and so on 1 does not, of course , mean that language has been
wholly ignored. Even within contemporary traditions of legal analysis,
circumstantial, anecdotal , intuitive and arbitrary observations and remarks
upon the character of legal language are common . These have generally
taken the form of comments upon the vocabulary and the syntax of
text-book and case-book law , and have also , increasingly, noted the peculiarities of legislative drafting. 2 At their most extravagant , disaffected
lawyers have broadened the scope of these perceptions into critiques of the
verbal nature of legal disputes , but the significance of the linguistic element
in this confrontation has been ignored : the historical task of systematically
relating linguistics to legal theory, and conceptions of language use to legal
practice, remains almost entirely in the future . For the purposes of suggesting that this nascent conjunction of law and language is both an obvious
and a necessary project , I shall outline the interrelations of law and
language according to a very broad, historical schema . The point is not
simply one of style or presentation . At the level of theory it bears a certain
polemical connotation . Both traditional linguistics and conventional jurisprudence have viewed their objects of study as being the "systems" or
"codes" that govern, respectively , language usage and law application as
potentialities rather than empirical actualities. In both disciplines, it is the
abstract imperatives of a notional system that forms the object of synchronic (static) scientific study ; actual meaning, actual usage and the diachronic
(historical) dimension generally, are largely ignored. Even the simplest of
historical surveys, however, will clearly indicate that formalist accounts of
language and of legal language are historically and geographically specific
and limited . More particularly, viewed historically as a rhetoric or as a
discourse - as linguistic practice first and foremost - the analysis of law
as a unitary, formal language is but one - tendentious and motivated possible account of legal communication. I shall argue throughout that if
linguistics is to be of use to legal studies, it will be as a sophisticated and to
some degree scientific method available for analysing the historical semantics of legal texts. Law, as a linguistic register or as a literary genre, can be
described linguistically or discursively in terms of its systematic appropriation and privileging of legally recognised meanings, accents and connotations (modes of inclusion) , and its simultaneous rejection of alternative
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and competing meanings and accents, forms of utterance and discourse
generally, as extrinsic, unauthorised or threatening (modes of exclusion).
To understand the coherence of this process of linguistic and semantic
inclusion and exclusion is to introduce the problem of the relationship of
law to power and to some extent to explain the characteristic modes of
legal utterance as social discourse - as a hierarchical (stratified) , authoritarian (distanced) , monologic (uniaccentual) and alien (reified) use of
language.
II . ORIGINS: RHETORIC AND EXEGESIS3

If the price of specialisation is often sterility, it is refreshing to recall that
the earliest tradition of legal criticism , forensic rhetoric, made no distinction between the study of law and that of the general forms of language use
as persuasion and inducement to action. The overwhelmingly distinctive
characteristic of classical rhetoric, that of Greece and of the first Roman
Empire,4 was the extraordinary breadth of the discipline and of its subject
matter. Rhetoric was the study of all forms of public speech and, at its best ,
it was a highly elaborate analysis of the appropriateness of language to its
context (audience) and its functions (practice - political , legal , ideological). Thus , for Aristotle , " rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of
discovering all the available means of persuasion in any subject ; ... and
accordingly we hold that the rules of the rhetorical art are not limited in
their application to any certain special definite class of subjects ." Rhetoric,
in other words, is universal, and a few sentences subsequent , we are
informed that " it is . . . a branch . . . of the science dealing with
behaviour, which it is right to call political. " 5 For Cicero as well, rhetoric is
the study of useful speech , speech adapted to the context of its audience
and their likely beliefs (topics) , speech likely to persuade by virtue of its
relevance to practice (res publica) and the immediate needs of the community that the rhetorician serves. For the early rhetoricians , in short ,
rhetoric was to study speech as action, namely speech that would persuade
by virtue of the systematic use of the linguistic and argumentative devices
that render discourse relevant and effective , " eloquence ... bringing (the
hearer) not merely to know what should be done , but to do what they
know should be done ." 6
In synoptic terms, the great synthetic studies of rhetoric ranged in scope
over a wide variety of disciplines which were later to be treated as discrete.
The rhetorician would study philosophy ( dialectic, argumentation and
proof) , politics, law, language and the social psychology of possible audiences. In each of these spheres , their interests were pragmatic and functional: in the context of the restricted republicanism and the various
assemblies and tribunals of the city state, language was power for those who
had access to the realm of public discourse . 7 Meaning, for the rhetorician ,
was determined by the actual social potentialities of communication and
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dialogue, meaning was linked not ~nly to truth (verisimilitude/probability)
but also, and just as directly, to the collective actions of the political
assembly, the legal judgment and the ceremonial occasion. In brief, rhetoric studied the availability of arguments to particular contexts (inventiol
general and specific topics), the manner of their arrangement (dispositio)
and the requisite style of their presentation (elocutio). The study of law was
but one subdivision of the rhetorical discipline, and legal arguments were
not to be differentiated or privileged as against other arguments - the
requirements of adversary justice and of legal judgment alike were to be
studied upon the same basis as the other political and philosophical social
practices. The rhetorical study of linguistic devices and methods of
argumentation, applied just as much to the legal speech as to any other: all
discourses were equal and their organisation was to be judged by similar
criteria of what was essentially an historical and political form of criticism. 8
For Cicero especially , rhetoric was the instrument of practice and of
practitioners, it was the art and criticism of public speech conceived not as
truth (stasis) but as the active and "topical" argumentation necessary for
the determination of the needs and choices of the historical and political
community. In short, history and labour were the source of speech and of
its argumentative topics, while rhetoric was the analysis of the propriety or
appropriateness of the language and arguments used to the institutional
and political goals of the community as a whole.
Despite the great merits and the obvious attractions of rhetoric; its
ability to study the determination of human behaviour and speech in terms
of the contingent and topical, the social and historical, facets of public
dialogue, as well as its conception of language as communication within a
context and by means of the inherently figurative and ambiguous semantics
of actual usage; it was historically and geographically short-lived. As a
methodology for the study of language and of law, it was indeed exceptional to the dominant tendencies within the development of the European
languages and early jurisprudence. Even the greatest practitioners of rhetoric admitted that it was dangerous,9 that probability was not truth , that
persuasion was not conviction and that analogy (metaphor) was not essence (necessity/uniqueness). 10 Suffice it to say that the subject matter of
rhetoric was too broad11 and the discipline did not long outlive the decline
of the republican and democratic institutions to whose practice it was
tied. 12 From Aristotle onwards the overwhelmingly dominant tendency in
the study of language was the endeavour to subjugate linguistics to logic
and to displace the study of speech as discourse or social utterance with the
analysis of language as analytics (the rules of demonstration based upon
univocal and necessary meanings) 13 and a corresponding concentration
upon the written text. 14 The democratic republican ethos of early classical
rhetoric was thoroughly exceptional to the dominant , centripetal or unifying tendencies within the European languages , and the correlative
centralisation or unification of the offical discourses of an essentially
hierarchial development of European linguistic culture. Latin became the
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official language of medieval Europe and philology - the study of dead
languages which, by virtue of that very fact , were "unities" - became the
predominant method of language study within the culture of the various
attempts to formulate a " universal grammar" or language of truth. 15 As
against the rhetorical conception of language as action and of meaning as
the effect of rhetorical practice, language was to be studied as "given", as
static and written ; language and meaning were always already produced or
"there", and merely awaiting the patient and passive understanding of the
philologist or exegete to recover the true meaning of the text , itself conceived as a unique and intentional , precedent, state of affairs. It remains to
be observed that the rise of the European rationalist philosophies in the
16th and 17th centuries coincided with the lowest ebb of the rhetorical
discipline 16 - it became the study of taxonomies of word based figures ,
the analysis of style , of the superficial , aesthetic and inessential features of
language use. Rhetoric was displaced by philosophy and by philology, by
the study of authoritative , monologic and univocal discourses in which
meaning was conceived as structural and necessary, given from above and
emanating towards a point below.1 7
While it is obviously impossible to generalise the restricted status of
rhetoric for the entire period in question , and even more invidious to
attempt to characterise its role within the differing institutional practices
and disciplines of post-classical European culture, it may nonetheless be
asserted that the central theme within the decline of rhetoric was its
increasing subordination to logic. The rhetorical was to be ever more
vehemently stigmatised as a second order of language - as the word
dwelling in a "borrowed home" - at one remove from the normative
linguistics , and corresponding philosophy of knowledge , which postulated
a primary order of language in which the meaning of words was singular
and real. That meaning came to be conceived by the exegetical tradition as
given or monologic implies that it has a source, an authority or singular
authorship that originally sets out the meaning and whose " will" may be
analytically or exegetically recovered. The paradigm forms of such meaning are , of course , those contained in religious and legal texts. 18 By way of
an introduction to an analysis of the dominant paradigm of linguistic
analysis within contemporary positivist jurisprudence, it may be observed
that the major historical legal systems have, in their ascendancy , resorted
increasingly to the written text , and ostensibly to the exegetical or interpretative control of their social practice by reference to such texts. The
reception of Roman law in medieval Europe in the 11th and 12th centuries,
which , in many respects, lies at the basis of the contemporary legal tradition, was an exemplary textual enterprise. The first law school, founded
at Bologna, was established precisely to study manuscripts, the newly
discovered Corpus Juris Civilis. The techniques of legal science developed
by the glossators in relation to the Justinian Codes were philological in the
extreme , they were techniques which presupposed the absolute , Biblical ,
authority of the texts of the Civil law. In short , the first law to be studied
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and taught in the West was not vernacular but oracular, it was contained in
a series of texts which were to be comprehended as containing a complete
and integrated body of doctrine, as the embodiment of reason and as the
"source of all deductions". 19 While noting that periods of dogmatic crisis
or of radical legal change , have frequently been accompanied by the
increasing irrelevance , or in legal terms desuetude, of the written law by virtue of contrary informal practices the code becomes a relic - it is
nevertheless interesting to note the continuity of the problem of textual
interpretation. The code , or more informally, the written law, has invariably, though with varying degrees of practical or actual relevance , been the
object of an elitist , revelatory or hierophantic, culture of interpretation.
An intricate and exclusive system of disciplinary or dogmatic tools, the
various forms of traditional exegesis and of traditional and indeed contemporary hermeneutics, were developed early and precisely, I would argue ,
to the effect of safeguarding and preserving the sanctity and general
impenetrability of the written word as a system of social control: " One
doesn't carry on a dialogue with the law, one makes it speak ."20

III . THE DOMINANT PARADIGM ; LINGUISTICS, LEGAL SCIENCE, LEGAL
SEMIOTICS21

In the space available, I can offer no more than a series of suggestions as to
the historical and sociological significance of the linguistic assumptions and
potential semiotics22 of contemporary traditions of " legal science" or positivistic jurisprudence. The contemporary status of structural linguistics, the
degree to which "pure" or positivistic theories of law are scientific, and the
utility of semiotic explanations of legal logic are all eminently contestable
and controversial issues. Having acknowledged such a state of affairs, I
shall attempt to evade the full heat of such controversy by examining the
historical interrelations and interconnections of linguistics and legal science
and by adverting briefly to the problems of such applications as have been
made of a structural legal linguistics, in the context of a descriptive overview.
The most striking and significant feature common to contemporary
linguistics and legal science is historical. They share both the time and the
place of their inception as sciences. The time was the last quarter of the
19th century and the place, and theoretical context, was that of central
European neo-Kantianism or philosophical positivism. 23 The result was a
common development and systematisation of language and of law according to a philological model of normative science in which the object of
study was to be the systemic determination of ideal rather than actual
speech and behaviour. The problem , in essence, is that of the birth of
structuralism24 , that of an objective idealism, which I will analyse first in its
linguistic manifestation.
The inception of linguistics as a science took the form of a resolution to
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conflicting tendencies within the preceding schools of language study. The
polemical context of Saussure's work was that of a series of " creationist" or
subjectivist theories of language developed , during the second half of the
19th century and with considerable success, by various schools of romantically inspired linguistics .25 Their concern was to attack the scientific status
of the dominant linguistics of the century, the work of the grammarians
and the studies of philology and of Indo-European phonetics , which
asserted, unequivocally, the uniformity of linguistic laws and the regularity
of language development in terms of a proto-language underlying and
explaining the individual variations of existent languages. As against the
grammarians' view that there could be and were universals governing
language forms , the creationist view of linguistics asserted that language
changed and developed by virtue of individual , subjective , innovations by virtue of transformations brought about by speakers themselves - and
consequently that the appropriate mode of linguistic study was psychological , sociological and historical.
To some degree appalled by the subjectivist strains within language
study, Saussure returned to and drew upon the dominant , philological and
exegetical, conception of language. Inspired by the model of phonetic laws
of sound changes. Saussure posed the question of the possibility of a
"science of language" in the neo-Kantian terms of a transcendental logical
assumption as to what language must be like for a scientific linguistics to be
possible. His conclusion was that the scope of linguistics must be defined , a
priori, as the study of " the forces that are permanently and universally at
work in all languages." 26 As the foundation of linguistics, Saussure inserted
the distinction between language-system (langue) and language use
(parole) 27 and argued that the status of linguistics as a science was dependent upon its restriction to the study of the laws of the language system as a
normative ideal or synchronic (static) systematicity - as a set of logical
universals, internally defined in a language totality conceived as a "state of
affairs" existing (notionally) outside of society and outside history.
The unity of language as an object of study is the limited and highly
abstract sense in which it constitutes a "self-contained whole and principle
of classification." 28 The overriding concerns of the science of language
were to be syntactic, morphological and phonetic. It would study language
in terms of its most basic units - signs or words - and these it would
analyse in their relation to the abstract system or whole that determined
their lexical or dictionary definition and their possible combinations at or
below the level of the sentence. Linguistic validity, or grammaticality, was
rule-governed; it did not concern actual usage but rather stated the laws
and limits of possible usage in relation to the very broad contours of
linguistic structure. Thus, for Saussure , signs were not meanings but
rather, were to be conceived as elements of a code which determined their
signifying function: each sign is the combination of a material signifier and
its signified (its lexical meaning) , which is in turn arbitrarily or conventionally given within the code , the system of signs as a unitary set of norms.
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What a sign signifies is consequently largely irrelevant : its combination
(syntagmatisation) is rule-governed , in that certain combinations are impossible or nonsensical within a given code , but beyond the highly vague
requirements of intelligibility determined by syntax, the actual combinations , utterances and meanings (parole) achieved within any specific context are deemed wholly unpredictable and unamenable to any form of
scientific study. In summary , the meaning or semantics of actual linguistic
practice were the " other" or opposite of science - the language system
was to be studied precisely to the exclusion of its realisation or application
within the actual life of language - and for this reason linguistics has
generally concentrated upon the unit of the sign at the level of the word as a form and not a content - as an equivalent (exchange value) in a
system of signification (circulation) , set free of the process and context in
which it came into being or was produced. 29 Langue becomes the opposite
of parole: the former was conceived of as rational , objective and norm
governed, the latter as irrational , subjective and historical.
A similar dualism can be discerned in the birth of positivistic legal
science . Allowing for disciplinary differences, its polemical and pragmatic
context was essentially comparable. At the level of theory it is indeed easy
to see that legal analysis has always faced a problem analogous to that of
the distinction between language system and actual utterance, between
concepts of the code and the meaning created in its application or realisation . It has been variously formulated as an opposition between legal
system and adjudication, legal validity and legal meaning, norm and its
volitional or discretionary application in legal judgment or practice . The
one is purportedly objective (deductive) , the other subjective and frequently discretionary. The more specific, historical, context of the Pure
Theory of law3° is equally analogous to that of structural linguistics. In the
context of legal studies , the threat to the dogmatic and exegetical tradition
of jurisprudential analysis took the form of a wide variety of historically
inspired, loosely creationist, theories of law .31 Kelsen's earlier writings
clearly evidence profound anxiety as to the inroads that social and historical ( or broadly rhetorical) studies of law were making upon the scientific
status of legal dogmatics. 32 His solution to the threat , as is well known , was
the reassertion of the scientific status of jurisprudence upon the basis of a
Kantian conception of normative analysis . Legal science was to study the
law in its "systematic" context , as a grammar and hierarchy of norms , as a
structure: " the law is an order, and therefore all legal problems must be set
and solved as order problems . In this way legal theory becomes an exact
structural analysis of positive law , free of all ethical-political value
judgments. " 33 The condition of legal analysis as normative science is, for
Kelsen , to be the transcendental logical presupposition of any legal system ,
the basic norm - the Kantian " idea" which founds the unity and form of
the whole.34 Suffice it to say that the specific system of laws or norms is to
be studied as a · logical, internally defined, normative unity. The legal
details of such a science are adequately described elsewhere35 , the question
180

of significance to the study of law and language is that of the nature of this
legal grammar or syntax proposed by the Pure Theory of law and to all
intents and purposes carried over into the later Anglo-American jurisprudential positivisms. 36
The grammar of law is predominantly a grammar of written law, and an
analysis of the formal limitations - the underlying, governing,
structure - of legal meaning. Meaning is to be conceived in objectivist,
logical, terms as a syntax or hierarchy of authorisation in which the validly
constituted norm or "ought" statement provides the objective, externally
given, meaning of human behaviour. 37 Recalling the Saussurian distinction
between langue (real) and parole (fortuitous), it may be observed that
Kelsen elaborates an essentially similar distinction between legal validity
(real) and legal volition (fortuitous) or between positive law and the
judicial application of legal norms. 38 The Saussurian conception of
language system - the code or semiotic of linguistic laws - can be
matched, detail for detail, to the Kelsenian grammar of legal structure analogously, the code or semiotic of legal communication conceived as the
objective direction of human behaviour according to a syntax of specifically legal meanings, or "pure" legal "signs". The linguistic problem of the
grammaticality of an utterance becomes that of the validity of a legal
statement analysed according to an objective syntax of "concretisation" or
"nomo-dynamics"39 In summary, the study of both linguistic and legal
structure as systems or codes, carries with it the attraction of clarity and
abstract verifiability in terms of propositional logic and presupposition.
These rather crude, early semiotics can provide a descriptive overview of
linguistic and legal rationality and certainty which is not only comforting to
those within the legal institution who have a professional interest in the
belief or mythology of legal determinancy, but also the intuitive appeal of
describing "the common sense position prevalent amongst most lawyers,
judges and legal scholars today. " 40
The study of language or of law in terms of the notional code or
underlying rules that govern the grammaticality or the legality of an utterance, is of undoubted interest in that it can scientifically describe the
mm1mum normative requirements whereby linguistic or legal
communication - as intelligibility, signification or syntax - is possible.
Intelligibility, of course, is not meaning, it is merely the normative context
within which meanings are realised. Semiotics, in other words, is not
semantics, it does not and cannot study meaning as actually realised or
manifested in text or utterance as historical and local events. Semiotics
studies the internal coherence of the object utterance, or the immanent
logic of the text and adds to an essentially descriptive concept of the
utterance or the text, the categories of a preferred metalanguage or theory.
The predominant characteristic of post-Saussurian semiotics has indeed
been precisely the development of numerous and diffuse metalanguages or
second order descriptive theories of semiotic systems. The analysis of sign
and code has become increasingly refined within the various and
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increasingly extensive contexts of its application. Literature, cinema,
psychoanalysis, law, anthropology, theology and aphasic disturbance are
but some of the fields and disciplines to which semiotics has made a
contribution. 41
Within the domain of legal semiotics the major treatises have been
produced on the continent. 42 While it would clearly be impossible to
describe the full spectrum of legal applications of semiotics, it is, I believe,
possible to comment upon certain shared generic features to those studies,
and to exemplify these I will subsequently briefly analyse one reasonably
typical analysis, that of A. J. Greimas. First, in annotated form, the
development of semiotics has generally been in terms of the elaboration of
various binary structural oppositions, within the linguistic system of
signification. The principal advances have concerned the oppositions of
paradigm (selection) and syntagm (combination), 43 denotation (reference)
and connotation (field of application), 44 metaphor (similarity) and
metonymy (contiguity). 45 The oppositions are general ones, they refine
and enhance the study of the sign in terms of the manner and rules
governing its operation within any given signifying system (set), be it
language, literature, the unconscious or law. Very loosely, different
signifying systems may be distinguished and defined upon the basis of their
characteristic modes of signification. Thus, for instance, for Barthes the
ideological language - or more accurately, the ideological dimension of a
language - is predominantly connotative, that is, non-referential or
wholly symbolic in its application. Jakobson, whose work in linguistics was
a significant influence upon the work of both Levi-Strauss and Barthes,
made various applications of the metaphor/metonymy distinction to argue
that, for example, epic and narrative literary genres are predominantly
metonymic in their semiotic functioning, whereas romantic and poetic
genres are largely metaphorical. Other studies have suggested that legal
discourse, viewed in terms of its contemporary, positivistic, self-definition,
is predominantly a denotative and metonymic signifying system.46
Implicit in the above comments is a further distinction of considerable
importance, that between semiotics and semantics as it affects the opposition of language system and discourse. The distinction between linguistics
and discourse analysis was originally elaborated in the work of the French
linguist E. Benveniste and will be returned to in the next section. 47 Within
the context of semiotics, the introduction of a semantics of discourse is of a
restricted significance, in so far as the dominant tendency has been that of
incorporating both categories into the overall, semiotic and synchronic
conception of language system. The semiotician has not generally been
concerned with the subjective, historical, social or diachronic dimensions
or implications of the categories of meaning and discourse. Thus, when A.
J. Greimas comes to analyse the semiotics - the syntax, narrative grammar and deep semantic structure - of particular discourses, his overriding
concern has consistently been that of elaborating binary oppositions 48
within the semiotic, notional, systems of signification, narrative and mean-
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ing. The legal text, for Greimas, is to be studied as an instance and
exemplification of a precedent model of structural codes. 49 To this end, the
analysis distinguishes - upon the basis of a wholly immanent study of the
text in question - the levels of linguistic code (legal language is a variant
of natural language), legal code (the norms and interpretative procedures
of the legal system viewed as a grammar) and legal judgment (the language
of "verification" and of legal validity) .50 In brief, Greimas adopts a view of
legal grammar and of the determinacy of legal language as a logic, which
refines but in no way challenges the earlier Kelsenian depiction of legal
syntax. Thus, the possibility of legal grammar takes the form of the
transcendental logical presupposition of any legal system , in which it is
stated that the legal code, "the ensemble of juridical enunciations, could
not exist except by virtue of an original performative act" 51 or implicit
constitutional promulgation. As to the description of legal practice " the production of law, of novel legal rules and significations" 52 - this is
to be understood in terms of a language of verification which takes the
practical form of existent jurisprudence and the procedures of valid concretisation. There are , of course, numerous linguistic subtleties to the
presentation of the analysis which have here been overlooked. In the end,
the point is that Greimas' analysis adds nothing of substance to the commonplaces of legal positivism - it adds linguistic refinement and precision. In a sense it represents the apotheosis of positivism in the addition of
a further layer of descriptive metalanguage superimposed upon the dominant belief in the univocality of legal language. The peculiar feature of
legal discourse (its specificity) is resident in its ability to " transform" and
"translate" (correct and verify) ordinary language and ordinary meaning
into the closed code of the legally relevant and legally valid .53 So far so
good - lawyers always claimed this as their role - but the interesting
question of how this process takes place , with what content and to what
substantive effect , it left unasked and unanswered.

IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ; SOCIOLINGUISTICS , SOCIAL DISCOURSE ,
LAW AS SOCIAL DISCOURSE 54

Insofar as the study of the relationship between language and society has
managed to transcend the structural analyses reviewed in the previous
section , and has gone beyond the philological and normative specification
of social relations and legal order, it has done so in terms of recourse to
rhetorical conceptions of language and of institutional discursive
practice. 55 The concept of rhetoric is , of course , very broad and protean .
In the present context , I take it to mean the study of language in terms of
semantics and in reliance upon the view that social and institutional as well
as linguistic contexts of utterance are determinative of both the form and
the content of communicational practice . Of its cultural sources, Nietzsche's reaction against rationalist philosophy , Christian theories of natural
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law, and the denigration of rhetoric generally, is an obvious and important
landmark.56 Of greater linguistic significance, however, was the contemporary reaction against the neo-Kantianism of Saussurian linguistics,
developed in the work of V. N. Volosinov, and taken up in the more recent
works of sociolinguistics which have explicitly argued for functional and
material concepts of language use. 57 Three central themes constantly crosscut the distinction between discourse analysis - the study of utterances in
terms of their rhetorical and communicative organisation58 - and
sociolinguistics - the study of language in relation to a wide variety of
social, anthropological, enthnographic, psychological and other
contexts - and may be summarised as follows.
First, a critical and negative point. The concept of discourse as introduced into linguistics in the work of Benveniste and Harris has always
rested unhappily beside the concept of language system as an autonomous
or virtual entity. While the study of language could not conceivably deny
the relative value and status of structural linguistic laws - the general
principles of lexicon and grammar - the critics of Saussurianism and of
later applications of semiotic theory have argued that the concept of a
"unitary" language and the categories of law-governed conceptions of
signification and meaning are one-sided and inadequate . Bakhtin is most
forceful on the point:
these norms do not constitute an abstract imperative; they are rather the generative
forces of linguistic life, forces that struggle to overcome the heteroglossia of language,
forces that unite and centralise verbal-ideological thought , creating within a hetroglot
national language the firm and stable linguistic nucleus of an officially recognised
language , or else defending an already formed language from the pressure of growing
heteroglossia. 59

Second , in pursuance of this initial point, the object of study in linguistics
moves from system to practice , from potential meaning to the determination and realisation of meaning within the concrete and hierarchical
organisational forms of social interaction. 60 The object of study becomes
the "actually existent" language system in its historical and social development; the study of the "internal stratification" of the national language,
according to "social dialects, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of
the authorities , of various circles and passing fashions, languages that serve
the specific socio-political purposes of the day, even of the hour ... " 61 The
third and most contentious point concerns meaning and control over meaning, the power to define. The semantics implied by the concepts of heteroglossia and of linguistic stratification is dialogic and wholly rhetorical: meaning is never to be treated as "given" in advance as an object of passive
philological comprehension but must rather be approached in the active
and critical framework of its social, institutional and hierarchical discursive
context: "Every discourse has its own selfish and biased proprietor; there
are no words with meanings shared by all , no words belonging to no-one
. .. who speaks and under what conditions they speak, this is what deter184

mines the word's actual meaning. All direct meanings and direct expressions are false. " 62 The question , in short, is that of the social
authorisation - the objective as opposed to the subjective motivation of utterance meaning; the description and analysis of the significance of the
syntax and semantics of utterance forms according to the broad framework
of the social and institutional order of discourse , the attribution of value to
specific meanings and discourses. In brief, the argument concerns the
appropriation and institutionalisation of meaning and discourse, the process of selection whereby a particular set of socially orientated interests
and usages gain control of a discourse and define the social accenting and
paradigm forms of meaning that are to prevail and to win credibility. In
more general terms, the question is that of the social legitimacy of specific
linguistic practices, the question of the social production and control of
meaning in the form of an order of discourse which determines what can
and should be said - in the form, for example, of a speech, a judgment, a
sermon, a pamphlet, a report, a programme and so on. The question is that
of who is speaking? "Who has the right to speak? Who is qualified to do
so? Who derives from it their own special quality, their prestige, and from
whom, in return, do they receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what they say is true? What is the status of the individuals
who - alone - have the right sanctioned by Jaw or tradition , juridically
defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?" In more
formal terms, Foucault argues elsewhere that:
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth : that is, the types of
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means whereby each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth ;
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 63

Prior to outlining the specific linguistic framework within which legal
language can be studied as a social discourse, I shall briefly comment upon
such studies as have in part attempted to recognise the social context of
legal linguistic practice.
First, at the level of legal theory, some mention should be made of the
theory of communication , or hermeneutic, contained in the work of H. L.
A. Hart.64 In the present context, I shall do so by way of two related
problems concerning the legal utterance's context, rather than by way of
attempting any extensive account of Hart's well known and highly eclectic
remarks upon the philosophy of language. In appearance at least, the
adoption of the slogan " meaning equals use" 65 or the comparable view that
the meaning of a word is to be discovered by reference to the role which it
plays within a "form of life", 66 has considerable sociolinguistic significance. Closer examination of these theories reveals inadequacies both of
methodology and of substance. 67 The linguistic methodology of Hart's
concept of law has to be recovered analytically in view of the unsystematic
character of his predilection for making passing comments, upon the
nature of language and its relevance to legal decision making. 68 Without
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rehearsing the analyses made in. terms of the " peculiar" nature of legal
language (it has no extra-legal referent) and of "core" and "penumbra!"
meanings, it is sufficient to observe his utilisation of a general linguistic
methodology which opposes linguistic/legal system (code) to individual
utterance or realisation in application. On the one hand, legal meanings
are "clear", "peculiar", conventional or institutional, while on the other
hand their application is, in the last analysis, frequently entirely intentional , and explicable only in terms of individual psychology. The residues
of meaning which fall outside the deductive application of general
language must be explained in the subjectivist terms of "illocutionary
force" ,69 in terms that is of authorial intention and the generally unknowable content of the "other mind".
In methodological terms the problem with Hart's positivist semantics is
its naivety in postulating an unmediated relation of individual utterance to
formal system or monologic whole. It is related to a problem of substance,
the overwhelming tendency of positivistic jurisprudence straightforwardly
to assert the existence of a social consensus as to meaning. 70 What it is
crucial to realise in relation to this semantics of consensus is that its
reference to law as "social fact" or to meaning as institutionally and
conventionally given, is "artistic" or technical rather than actual or empirical. The societal facts and categories normatively invoked by positivism
are of no greater empirical standing than that of passing references to the
unargued assumption or presupposition that law, as a form, and legal
relations generally, both represent an agreed moral order and are exercised within a static or synchronically conceived social structure, itself based
upon a consensus, ideal cohesion, or, to use the wholly appropriate 17th
century terminology, a social contract. Far from raising questions as to the
actual social and historical form of life which law represents and
perpetuates, 71 the theories act rather as rationalisations of a belief in a
conception of "man" and of social and moral order or codes, embedded in
classical liberal philosophy. The development of a sociolinguistics of legal
language has an important role to play in subverting the social amnesia of
the legal institution precisely by evidencing the linguistic mechanisms and
conflictual social reality of the production of meaning and the construction
and manipulation of consensus which forms the object of positivistic rhetorics.
To some extent, the major works to be published so far in the sociology
of legal language, those of P . Carlen and of W. O'Barr, do indeed suggest
the falsification of the systemic view of "given" legal meanings. In the
context of studies of the linguistics of courtroom interaction they reintroduce the rhetorical concepts of linguistic stratification, audience and dialogue into the description of the social and theatrical reality of legal
control. 72 What is at issue in these studies of spoken legal language is the
linguistics and stylistics of credibility or meaning effects. The social status
of a group-class-or gender-specific linguistic practice 73 can be analysed in
terms of the hierarchical organisation of legal communication and can be
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classified according to the schemata of lexical , syntactic, semantic and
discursive choices regularly employed in the use of one language (legal) to
control , appropriate or exclude other meanings and languages. There are
two implications to these studies which deserve detailed attention. They
necessitate, first , a topology of utterance forms within which legal discourse
would be one of many classifications of social speech variant or genre, and ,
second , a concrete linguistic analysis of the languages, codes and contexts
of the legal audience. These two requirements may be summarised as
follows.
As a rhetorical genre (discursive formation) , the specific character of
legal language is, historically, that of a predominantly written language. Its
origins are religious and hieratic 74 and its modes of self-presentation are
exegetical (scriptural) and philological. The unity of legal language as
developed by tradition and history is based upon an epistemology of legal
sources; the "law-giver" , the " sovereign" or the legislature is always
pre-existent , and is to be treated according to the elaborate etymologies
and semantics of recollection in and through the text - restricted commentary, citation, quotation , usage and the paraphenalia of repetition
generally are the typical modes of legal education and dissemination. In
short , legal language is a unity to be understood as the social image of the
argot or language of elite or professionalised power; it is the language of
authority, which takes the discursive form of monologue, distance (temporal and hierarchical) , and specialisation. To comprehend the social and
sociolinguistic implications of such a linguistic practice requires the classification of the manner in which the social significance and status of the legal
institution is reflected and reified in the organisation of the kgal text itself.
The levels of such an analysis are those, as I have suggested, of lexicon ,
syntax, semantics and ideology. Each category is to be comprehended in its
discursive context, and I will briefly outline in what follows one possible
classification of the distinctive features of legal discourse as social discourse, in terms of a series of introductory observations. At each level, the
question to be raised is sociolinguistic and rhetorical - in its broadest
formulation it is that of who is speaking, to whom and under what circumstances?
(i) Institutionalisation. The most obvious feature of legal discourse is its
production within specific, highly restricted, institutional settings. In the
terms of one recent study, " legality would be nothing if it were not
supported by a network of institutions, a tradition of ideas which always
encloses and delineates the domain within which legal discourse can exercise its textual practice. " 75 The connotative , symbolic and ideological
dimensions of the affinity of legal text to legal and social hierarchy - the
discursive techniques and sanctions which restrict and delimit who may
speak, on what topic and with what content - are of profound significance
to an understanding of legal rhetoric. In one aspect, the entire process of
socialisation into the legal institution, from entry into law school to
membership of the profession itself, is an elaborate process of education
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into the manner and techniques of deference and respect for the authority
of legal sources and the procedures and languages of its hierarchical
organisational forms . Together with the more obviously distinctive features of the legal sub-culture - its ritual trappings , its restricted and
theatrical institutional settings, the elite character of its personnel , the
extent of its power to punish - attention should also be given to the
methodology of legal study as a discipline based upon a hegemonic belief in
the autonomy of the legal hierarchy and the self-evidence of its authority.
In short , legal discourse is socially and institutionally authorised affirmed, legitimated and sanctioned - by a wide variety of highly visible
organisational and sociolinguistic insignia of hierarchy, status, power and
wealth. These insignia, the identifications of a privileged class, are what
initially differentiates the legal institution and its discourse from the closely
related domains of political , religious and ethical discourse.
(ii) Lexicon and Syntax . In many respects one of the principal features
distinguishing the legal institution from other institutions , and its disciplinary methodology from those of other disciplines, is precisely its language.
To learn the law is to learn an archaic and specialised vocabulary and
syntax. 76 Concentration upon the derivation and etymology of a legal
dictionary of meanings, together with elaborate rules and procedures of
reference , delimitation and construction , facilitate the image of a contextindependent lexicon of legal meanings , an elaborated code , whose syntactic and semantic limitations are systemic (connotative) and consequently
intentional, insofar as the vocabulary and its manipulation are unrestricted
by referential constraints. The self-contained , highly cohesive and localised
character of the legal text are best analysed in terms of specialisation and
the avoidance of agency - relexicalisation, nominalisation, thematisation
and automatic figurative register - the syntax of impersonality and distance, producing indirect control in terms of attitude and generalisation
rather than direct command or speech act. 77 Even or especially at the level
of lexico-grammatical system , the specialised nature of legal rhetoric as an
apparently unitary , internally shielded and valorised , system of communication is peculiarly clear. Legal discourse presents itself as a contextindependent code , as the authoritative elaboration of the logical entailments of a distanced and obscure language system which operates by
means of an elaborate series of textual methodologies of recollection ,
recovery and relexicalisation. Legal discourse is pre-eminently prior discourse, a discourse that is already " written" and requires only the addition
of the passive philological techniques of reinvocation. Legal discourse has
its primary basis in custom , and its vocabulary is correspondingly governed
by doctrines of memory, recognition and usage , defined in textual terms by
reference to extensive and obscure etymologies, inert and calcified meanings and ·procedures, and finally by an epistemology, in the last resort , of
the "sources" of law in which words are transmitted by a dogmatics of
quotation , reference, citation and specialised and restricted
commentary - the techniques, in short , of a textual repetition which
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disavows the relevance of the lives and commitments of its rhetoricians to
the monologic symbolic usages which they discover and declare.
(iii) Semantic appropriation. If the generic character of the legal vocabulary and syntax are distinctive and important features of the language of
the law, it is for the reason that they facilitate a number of significant
semantic operations. Very broadly, the lexicon and syntax of the legal
discipline constitute a connotative code , a code of generic legal meanings
amenable to the syntax of generalisation and impersonality within which
the normative reformulations, paraphrases and self-evident - contextindependent - meanings of legal discourse as a genre or discursive formation are possible. The hegemony of legal meaning or the self-presentation
of legal language as a unitary code is the subject-matter of the study of
semantic appropriation. It is at the level of semantics that the legal construction of meaning in terms of characterisation, instancing (narrative
structure), presupposition and preconstruction is to be undertaken. 78 The
question here is that of the relationship between law and other discourses
(interdiscourse), most obviously evident in the legal depiction of the subject matter of disputes, the characterisation of the actors and of group .
interaction, the relative status of conflicting languages of description and
evaluation. In semantic terms, legal discourse is a site of a coherent set of
synonyms, paraphrases, substitutions and equivalences generally. The
legal formulation of meaning not only presupposes a variety of consensus
as to already existent social values, but equally projects the image of the
sovereignty of the legal characterisation of such meanings within the discrete logic of the legal text. Legal meaning arrives after the event to
reconstruct the discourse of others and to rewrite the diversity of social
languages in terms of the purportedly neutral or artistic significances
(accents) and relevancies of juridical sovereignty applied to abstract, individualised instances of regulation or discipline. Semantic appropriation is,
in brief, the power of the legal text to define its own , very narrow ,
conceptions of meaning, and simultaneously to exclude alternative meanings, accents and contexts.
Further, as the term appropriation implies , the primary issue in relation
to the law's own definition of itself as a unitary language , is that of a
rhetoric of "inclusion" or identification; that is, of a stratification of
language of sufficient social power intentionally to determine the language
and discourse exterior to it. By subordinating surrounding discourses to the
authority of legal semantics, legal discourse must also exclude and
stigmatise - define out - all such discourses as are inherently recalcitrant to the basic belief system and preconstructions of legal language as an
ideology. To detail fully the semantics of appropriation within legal discourse is beyond the scope of the present study though it is possible, in
view of the centrality of the issue , to outline the structure that such
appropriation takes.
The rhetoric of law is at its most basic the rhetoric of sovereignty and
power, of rights and duties. It is the discourse of power in a dual sense. On
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the one hand it presupposes the semantic constant of the ethical and
political discourse of liberal individualism, of freedom, equality and consensus as the inherent features of the unsystematised and unexamined
social relations within which legal discipline operates. On the other hand
these preconstructions of legal interdiscourse emerge in the legal text as
powerful devices for excluding and obscuring alternative or oppositional
readings and meanings of concrete decisions or instances of regulation . It is
precisely the assumed universality of the rhetorical categories that implies
their ethical and political desirability while at the same time allowing their
highly refined manipulation within a normative justificatory argument to
obscure the conditions and actual circumstances of their application. They
enable the appropriation of concrete meanings, in the form of the institutionalisation of generalised control by means of attitudes and norms
that never expose themselves to the threat of a detailed examination of the
concrete motives and circumstances of their application .
(iv) Ideology. Finally , the law constitutes a concrete sociolinguistic belief
system. As a professionalised stratification of the national language , and as
a discourse or set of discursive processes, it functions to legitimate the
"evident" or assumed meanings, accents and purposes of legal discipline
and the social order upon which it is based. The textual functioning of legal
ideology has generally, though not always very helpfully, been described in
terms of the " subject form " of its operation as an ideology. 79 The abstract,
legal and rhetorical unity of the individual subject and the coherence of its
acts (deeds) , works ideologically to disperse or negate alternative readings
and meanings based upon historical and collective forms of social interaction and change .80 What is at issue, specifically in relation to legal discourse, may be formulated in terms of an ideology of legal sovereignty
which separates and opposes the objective unity of the legal institution and
its language - that of an axiomatic and imperative normative code - to
the equally abstract or notional particular instance towards which the law
applying act is directed. Sovereignty and authority and the linguistic
objectification which they imply are never something in themself. They are
both a relation and a process directed towards the contemporary instance
of regulation , the equally notional and unitary legal subject . Objectification produces subjectification , the definition and delimitation of the
object of legal regulation, the application of the norm to a dispersed field
of singular legal subjectivities. Thus the subject in law is constituted as a
point of abstract equivalence , and the ethical image of speaking person as a
unitary and unique subjectivity comes to pervade substantive legal discourse and the numerous legally recognised forms of utterance testimony, declarations , confessions, contracts and documentation genrally. More significantly perhaps in relation to ideology, the law fixes legal
meaning to individual acts, conceived in the abstract terms of intention and
responsibility, and in so doing it constantly evades the question of its own
material and historical genesis or basis and effects. By treating legal disputes according to the rhetoric of individual acts, the legal text reifies its
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meaning and obscures or mystifies the real relations which form the context of such actions and the explanation of their motives. By means of a
process of individualisation or subjectification and subsequent generalisation the categories of legal argument work to manipulate and transpose
existent human beings - the diffuse, complex and changing biographical
entities of motivated interaction - into the ethical and political subjects of
legal rationality and formal justice. In broader terms , the legal use of
language rewrites the individual, as it rewrites speech, in terms of a
notional and static unity of reasoned intentions , the basic precondition of
the law as the political-administrative discourse of liberal individualism.

V. CONCLUSION AND EXEMPLIFICATION

It has been my purpose throughout this paper to criticise the dominant
view within both linguistics and jurisprudence , that would hold that
language as well as legal communication are to be understood best as
structurally determined activities , as specialised normative enterprises that
can be studied scientifically according to the internal laws , or grammar , of
a static, governing, code. The relevant objection to any such structural
accounts of linguistics or of legal language is that it privileges the concept
of a system and the desire for order, over and against the history of the
system and the possibility of accounting for the actual relationships and
usages that determine its realisation. It may , further , be suggested that
from the viewpoint of the history of linguistics and of jurisprudence , the
concepts of universal grammar and of univocal legal code , have specific
political and ideological motives and affiliations , they are broadly those of
the desire to present linguistic study and legal practice as specialised
activities removed from the everyday commitments and discourses of social
and political practice and conflict. 8 1
It is against this background that I believe it is valuable to reassert the
rhetorical, sociolinguistic and loosely pragmatic dimensions and contexts of
any communicational practice. It is in many senses the defining paradox of
contemporary legal culture that its ideology is one of consensus and of
clarity - we are all commanded to know the law - and yet legal practice
and legal language are structured so as to prevent the acquisition of such
knowledge by any other than highly trained specialists in the various
domains of legal study. To understand the paradox of the social discourse
of the law requries an interdisciplinary approach to legal texts as well as to
the informal practices of the legal institutions, and will include the study of
the rhetoric of law, the analysis of the context and pragmatics82 of legal
speaker and legal institution, the empirical examination of the functions
and affinities of law viewed as communication and as function. It should be
emphasised again , that these objects of study are not merely the subject
matter of an internal analysis of the legal discipline and its formal self
representation , they require as well the analysis of the politics of legal
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language in terms of the social and intertextual character of legal communication, the principles of which are well captured in Bakhtin's view that:
Style organically contains within itself indices that reach outside itself, a correspondence of its own elements and the elements of an alien context . The internal politics of
style (how the elements are put together) is determined by its external politics (its
relationship to alien discourse) . Discourse lives, as it were , on the boundary between
its own context and another, alien , context .83

It is the alien context, the before and after of the legal utterance, that the
analysis of legal discourse as social discourse must aim to recover or
recapture from the interstices of an institution and textual discipline that
has all too frequently and easily defined itself by means of a near total
social amnesia. By way of conclusion, however, I shall restrict myself to a
somewhat simplified rhetorical analysis of the case of Bromley London
Borough Council v Greater London Council. 84 Confining the discussion to
the intratextual politics of legal signification, I shall provide a preliminary
analysis of a series of discursively important features to the judgments in
that case, viewed primarily in terms of semantic appropriation.
The broad contours, if not the details of the dispute can be summarised
succinctly from the judgment of Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal. 85 In
pursuance of an election manifesto, headed "Socialist Policy for the
G .L. C.", which "promised" and "committed" the Labour Party to reduce
fares on London's public transport services by 25%, the Labour Party,
upon election to a "small majority" of seats, acted to implement the cuts.
It did so by ordering the London Transport Executive to reduce fares by
25% and thereby, we are informed, presented the travelling public with a
"gift" of "millions of pounds" but simultaneously incurred the "displeasure" of the "ratepayers" by virtue of the subsidy of £69 million needed to
fund the "gift". The necessary financing was to be raised by a supplementary precept or rate which the London Boroughs "most reluctantly"
obeyed. More accurately, one specific London Borough, Bromley, evidenced reluctance and "challenged" the validity of the precept. It might be
noted, incidentally, at this stage, that we are nowhere informed that
Bromley, a Conservative controlled Borough, is geographically located
outside the principal London Transport networks and so obtained little
direct benefit from the fares reduction, and consequently had an exceptional if not unique motive of self-interest for their reluctance to pay the
precept. A final, somewhat ambiguous, feature of the case, was the Conservative Government's withdrawal of the rate support grant, a measure
intended to penalise overspending Councils and resulting in an additional
£50 million to the cost of the transport subsidy, which additional costs was
also to be raised by supplementary rate, and was, according to the judgments, quite unforeseen by the G.L.C.
I shall observe briefly that the language of this introduction or
characterisation of the case is already highly illuminating. As a putatively
impartial description of the facts of the dispute, it is a failure. As an
emotive stylistic characterisation of the parties to the dispute and a pre-
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liminary evaluation of their actions, its highly selective use of apparently
descriptive terms is of extreme intradiscursive and semantic relevance , it
signals ahead, or prepares the reader for the outcome which will later be
reached. Of especial importance , of course , is the use of the word " gift" to
describe the effect of the fares cut, its connotations being anthropological
or festive rather than economic. In combination with the other qualificatory factual and evaluative terms , it persuasively prejudges key aspects of
later discussion. It should also be noted that, in terms of information
conveyed, the details provided are uneven and very limited. Nor do the
subsequent judgments provide any more explicit particulars as to who
precisely is affected, in what ways, and by what decisions; aside from
general and unsubstantiated disavowal of the " propriety", "fairness' or
political " merits" of the policy decision, the contextualising details of the
case are assumed as summarily stated. Thus , Watkins L.J. deems it fit to
preface a remarkably bizarre and unargued judgment with the assertion, in
his first sentence, that he has "no doubt whatsoever that the large reduction of fares . .. arose out of a hasty, ill-considered , unlawful and arbitrary
use of power", and continues that " the ratepayers of this great city, who
are unlikely to gain anything from it (many will in fact be at a loss), will
bear the costs of what seems to many to have been an astounding
decision. " 86 Just as Lord Denning omits to detail which London Boroughs
were reluctant to pay the supplementary precept and why, Lord Justice
Watkins fails to elaborate either on who was " astounded" by a decision
which had been well publicised as a feature of an election campaign or why
they chose to be so astounded. Of the other prefatory remarks , I will
merely note Lord Diplock's formulation that "all your Lordships are
concerned with is the legality of that decision: was it within the limited
powers that Parliament has conferred by statute upon the G.L.C. " 87
Needless to say, it is precisely the broad or limited scope of the powers
conferred which is the legal issue at stake in the case.
The omission of any detailed analysis of the relations - socio-economic
and political - between the various , homogeneously conceived, actors in
the dispute , and the replacement of descriptions by rhetorically significant
assumptions, will transpire to be crucial to the language and reasoning of
the decisions. Before analysing the legal details of the judgments, which
details take the form of a broad series of loosely co-ordinated remarks as to
the meaning of various passages and terms in the Transport (London) Act
1969, certain other, seemingly incidental, peculiarities deserve comment.
In the broad terms of administrative law, the case concerns the general,
and indeed superbly vague, principle of " reasonableness" , whose definition, as a doctrinal restriction upon the exercise of statutory powers, has
remained largely unchanged since the 17th century. Powers must be exercised reasonably, fairly , justly and in good faith; or alternatively, they must
not be exercised unreasonably, arbitrarily or fancifully. To these selfidentical or tautological propositions one can only add descriptions of cases
in which powers have been held to have been utilised either reasonably or
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unreasonably. Although the analogy would appear to be a precarious one,
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords referred to the decisions
of Roberts v Hopwood88 and Prescott v Birmingham Corporation89 and
succeeded in eliciting from these arguably somewhat notorious decisions,
general support or authority for the view that principles of "socialistic
philanthropy" or of "feminist ambition" are "eccentric" and "unreasonable", and from the second authority, the more relevant assertion that
"benevolent" or "philanthropic" behaviour will not satisfy the fiduciary
duty of a statutory authority to run transport services upon commercial
lines found to be implicit in a 1930 statutory provision authorising the
charging of such fares "as they may think fit. " 90 The Prescott decision
concerned the granting of free travel to old-age pensioners, and while that
decision clearly suggested a particular attitude towards provision of transport services, the instant decision concerned radically different circumstances and distinct statutory provisions. In view of the general agreement
in the instant decision that it was the provisions of the 1969 Act that
determined the outcome, the analogical relevance, both factual and legal,
of the precedent decisions and the use of the phrase "ordinary business
principles", is ill-specified in the judgments, and largely obscure. Again,
the reference to the earlier authorities briefly adverted to early in the
judgments, is of a rhetorical or persuasive value - it suggests an amorphous background legality to the decision - but is not of any more specific
or logical instrumentality.
Of an altogether greater significance with regard to the instancing of the
G.L.C. case is the politically curious view which the judgments took with
regard to the respective rights of ratepayers, the travelling public and the
electorate in the erstwhile democracy of local government. The issue is a
complex and important one and will be discussed in greater detail in
relation to the term "economic" below. For the moment, I would merely
note the view expressed that an election manifesto is not binding. To
regard an election result as giving a mandate to fulfil a specific promise or
as creating a commitment, come what may, was, for Lord Denning, "a
complete misconception." He continued to state "very few of the electorate read the manifesto in full. A goodly number only know of it from what
they read in the newspapers or hear on television. Many know nothing
whatever of what it contains. When they come to the polling booth none of
them vote for the manifesto ... they vote for a party and not a manifesto."
Slightly further on, the reader is informed that "when the party gets into
power, it should consider any proposal or promise afresh, on its merits,
without any feeling of being obliged to honour it or being committed to
it. " 91 Other judges were less ebullient in their language but fully agreed
both that the electorate was only one of the groups to be considered in the
implementation of policy, and secondly that extensive consideration
should be given to ratepayers as a separate category, many of whom cannot
vote. The duty owed to electors emerges as promissory and indirect, while
the duty owed to ratepayers is direct and proprietary and would, on
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occasion , appear to override the electorate's policy preferences. The crucial question, of course, is that of the circumstances and reasons which will
create a paramount duty to the ratepayers, a question which only becomes
fully obscured when the provisions of the Act itself come under discussion.
I do not intend to deal with the numerous arguments concerning different aspects of the Act in any detail. As Lord Diplock expressed it, the
language of the Act is sometimes " opaque and elliptical", it "lacks clarity" , and is on occasion " baffling" .92 Nowhere is the lack of clarity more
.evident than in the sections dealing with the discretionary powers of the
G.L.C. Under section 1 a general duty is specified in terms of policies
aimed to develop and encourage measures which will promote the provision of "integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities for Greater
London. " By section 3 the G.L.C. is empowered to make grants to the
L. T.E . "for any purpose", in relation to meeting the "needs" of Greater
London. By section 11 (3) alterations in fare arrangements may be to
achieve " any object of general policy specified by the council. " I have
already indicated the view that the powers granted by the Act as a whole
were seen to be broad, in the sense that the language of their expression
was frequently indeterminate. The Act confers "a large degree of
autonomy. " 93 It allows the implementation of general public policies, and
at several points the judges were concerned to stress that " discussion at the
political level" as to the extent and manner of financing public transport
" as a social service" by means of subsidies , and with a view to best meeting
"needs" , was of " considerable relevance to a proper understanding of the
language of the Act ." 94 Elsewhere, the court " must recognise" that such
debate exists. 95 Aside from an incidental and brief quotation from the
Labour Party manifesto , mentioning how " better services , less congestion ,
better housing, more jobs, and a safer, cleaner, environment" 96 were
benefits directly and indirectly related to the transport subsidy, the case is
remarkable for its utter refusal to consider arguments and calculations as to
the costs and benefits - the effects - of the transport subsidy. On the
other hand , the case is even more remarkable for the unargued and
uncalculated assumptions which it makes precisely as to what the costs and
benefits of the G .L.C. actions were. They did so primarily in the form of
discussions as to the meaning of the words " economy" and " economic" in
various sections of the Act.
The semantic appropriation of the term economic was one of the principal achievements of the decision as a whole . The process of institutionalising an acceptable " legal" meaning was marked by a superb
diversity of discursive strategies. Again. it must be stressed that the context
of this lexical and semantic appropriation was that of the general admission of the vagueness and indeterminacy of the Act and of the word
economic. It was stated that the legislature itself had in all probability
failed to resolve the political controversy surrounding the meaning of the
word economic at the time of passing the Act. The Court was forced to
construct its own meaning for the term . A wide variety of approaches
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emerged. For Lord Scarman, the term "economic . . . has several meanings. They include both those for which the appellants contend and that for
which Bromley contend. " 97 He concludes that it means both "costeffective" and that the burden on the ratepayers be avoided or diminished
"so far as it is practicable to do so. " 98 The G.L.C. has a right under the Act
to subsidise the travelling public, if London's transport "needs" indicate
that it should do so. In the event, however, the G.L.C. acted "impracticably" and "uneconomically", "policy preference" wrongfully displaced
"economic necessity". 99 At this point I shall merely note the apparent
mutual exclusion of the categories of the economic and policy.
For Lord Wilberforce, the word economic is vague, although it eventually transpires to mean that transport services should be run on "businesslike or economic lines," but, paradoxically, this did not mean that it was
required to make "or try to make, a profit." 100 It is to be understood
rather, in terms of the dual duty owed to the travelling public and the
ratepayers, to exclude all non-economic arguments and considerations.
Before analysing what these exclusively economic considerations actually
are, I shall briefly advert to the equally broad elucidations provided by the
Court of Appeal. For Lord Denning, the 25% reduction in fares was quite
simply "a completely uneconomic proposition done for political motives,
for which there is no warrant ... . " The duty of the G .L.C. was to charge
ratepayers what was "reasonable and no more", a duty to be balanced with
a "conflicting" duty owed to the travelling public, by taking into account
"all relevant considerations ... on either side. They must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations ... They must hold the balance fairly
and reasonably." 101 In the event the G.L.C. had given undue weight to
their "arbitrary" manifesto commitment, and had been less than fair to the
ratepayers. Somewhat curiously, Lord Denning explained that he saw no
difference "between abolishing fares altogether and cutting them by onehalf or one-quarter", they are all gifts to the travelling public wholly devoid
of "financial rationality" - "why not 20% or 30% or even 50% ?" 102
Penultimately, Lord Justice Oliver adds to the view that economic means
breaking even "so far as is practicable", the view that general policy
objectives cannot "be an object arbitrarily selected by the G.L.C. for
reasons which have nothing to do with the functions which it is required to
perform ... It must be an object of general policy ... for the promotion
of an integrated , efficient and economic transport system." Lord Justice
Watkins writes of a "total disregard" for the interests of the ratepayers of
Bromley "and every other borough of London ." Running the transport
system on other than "business" lines could have "disastrous
consequences. " 103
It is the tacit content and motivations underlying the actual application
of their Lordships' very general and frequently wholly ambiguous formulations of the law that is the key point of interest. First , however, a brief
comment upon the general interdiscursive form of the argument. In reaching their conclusions, the judges utilise many of the standard preconstruc196

tions of the discursive formation as a whole. (i) The sovereignty of legal
discourse is not only expressed tacitly in the axiomatic character of much of
the argument and its manipulation of evaluative epithets, but also explicitly
in the assertion of the independence of the legal issues from the political
debates and controversies. The Law Lords are not concerned with the
evaluation of the political or general policy dimensions of the G.L.C.
decision. The language of the text , however, would appear to indicate the
precise opposite. The reasonableness of the G.L.C. 's substantive decision is
a constant object of ethically imbricated comments, their duty to the
electorate is analysed in some detail and legally circumscribed, and the
meaning of the term " economic" is considered specifically in relation to
general transport policies that range from the arbitrary and socialistic to
the business-like and fair. (ii) A subsidiary device , is the reiteration at
various points of the " artistic" character of legal reasoning. The issues to
be decided are technical and verbal, they concern the syntax and construction of a specific statute. Again , however, the general evidence discussed
in the judgments evidences the necessary interrelation of syntax and
semantics. Any of a number of conclusions can be reached upon the
wording of the Act itself, and the Act is vague and baffling (if somewhat
less so than the judgments) and must be construed purposively, in its
context and with reference to " all the relevant considerations". (iii)
Finally , the instancing of the discourse with regard to the subjective rights
and duties at issue. The dispute does not concern the socio-economic and
political relations actually appertaining between different social groups or
classes. These are indeed never discussed . What is at issue is the relation
between and relative weight of three sets of abstract and in this instance ,
we are told, conflicting rights and duties. The electorate, the travelling
public and the ratepayers are the actors, listed in the ascending order of
their actual importance , in this epic struggle to tame power by law. Again,
the issue is purportedly legal and so isolated from other discourses and
from the realm of actual interests and their interrelationships. The rights
and duties involved are statutory and notional , their agents are similarly
context-independent legal subjects - empty discursive spaces which the
judgments provide with morally and rhetorically significant contents.
Suffice it to say that the generality of the formal arguments and the
ambiguity of the norms or rules to be applied within the space of interdiscourse effectively permit the Court to institutionalise or appropriate any of
a large number of meanings to resolve the case. One could indeed plausibly
argue that the normative resolution to the dispute is of little or no relevance or pertinence to the actual decision " upon the facts " - it would
always have been possible, in terms of the latitude normatively available, to
decide and justify a decision for either of the parties to the dispute. The
question which arises, in other words, is that of why the case was
decided - on its facts - in favour of the Bromley Council. There is , of
course, no single answer available to this question. A number of different
reasons and rulings could plausibly be extracted from the case 104 although
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the predominant issue is probably correctly posed as being the meaning of
the word "economic." Devoid of any adequate dictionary definition, the
term was to be appropriated in its various linguistic contexts. These in turn
proved inadequate and it was deemed necessary to analyse, very briefly,
certain of the economic relations actually involved in the case. At no point
in the case, however, was any attempt made to prove that the actual logic
or actual effects of the G.L.C. 's decision were "uneconomic." The inflated
circulation of terms of moral condemnation within the judgments was not
matched by any comparable analysis of what would have been the economically rational way to run London Transport. As one commentator has it,
"nobody who had read anything at all on the economics of public transport
would have concluded that the economically rational way to run London
Transport was by trying as hard as one could to make revenue meet
costs. " 105 Upon even the most elementary comprehension of economics, it
is clear that there are numerous plausible economic arguments in support
of subsidies, and further, that in terms of an overall analysis of costbenefit106 it would be highly unwise to suppose that one could characterise
the costs and the benefits of the G.L.C. fare subsidy in the manner in
which the House of Lords appeared to.
In the course of a number of general assertions , the Law Lords appear to
view the economics of subsidy in the highly simplistic terms of a straightforward, short-term, detriment to all ratepayers and a direct, gratuitous,
benefit to the travelling public. As this view is frequently crucial to the
reasoning of the judgments, its details deserve comment. It excludes from
the outset the possibility of a short-term loss producing a long-term
benefit in the form, for instance , of a restructuring and reversal of the
decline of inner city transport systems by means of incentives to use public
rather than private transport. The short-term loss is paramount, and their
Lordships deem it to fall exclusively upon the ratepayers: 40% or less of
ratepayers use the public transport facilities; 60% neither vote nor travel
on the transport services. The latter are apparently the real losers and , by
implication, receive no benefit for their losses. A moment's reflection
suggests that this is not as obviously true as it seems. Two categories of
economic argument would appear to support an opposite conclusion, without entailing any technical economic concepts whatsoever. There are,
firstly, arguments based upon benefits to non-consumers. Transportation
facilities affect non-travellers in a variety of ways. These side-effects
(externalities) may be beneficial or harmful but presumably it is permissible to assume that where the positive externalities are valued higher than
the size of the subsidy, the beneficiaries of these side-effects will be
prepared to pay for them in the form of rates. The decision in the G.L.C.
case made great play upon the hardship caused to companies and
businesses by the fare subsidy. Two side-effects of the subsidy are directly
relevant to such an argument. First, a cheap and efficient transport service
will benefit businesses and traders in the centre of cities, insofar as most
people who travel to city centre shops do so by public transport. 107
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Further, social and recreational stimulus to the city centre will benefit
other firms. There is no reason why those affected should not contribute to
the cost of these benefits. More marginally, there is also the benefit of
creating employment, which was specifically stressed in the Labour Party
manifesto. So too was a reverse argument concerning the removal of
unwanted externalities - that the environmentally and socially harmful
side-effects of private transport: noise, pollution, death, injury, congestion, and the costs of remedying these negative externalities, would be
reduced by the subsidy. The issues involved are directly economic, yet the
Law Lords denied the possibility of making these decisions ( to purchase
desired goods) upon grounds which they alleged to be economic.
The arguments mentioned are, of course, no more than a few, simplified, instances of possible economic analyses of the actual costs and
benefits of the decision to subsidise London Transport. Of the more
technical concepts relevant, that of "option value" (consumption without
purchase) most clearly supports the previous list of benefits to non-users.
Very briefly, the existence of a service is often of financial benefit to
non-users. In the case of transport, financial calculations as to the purchase
or maintenance of other forms of transport can be directly affected by the
existence of alternatives providing an option in the event of the breakdown, failure or future and unforseen exigencies affecting the primary
choice of transport. The financial value of having the option to use something is its option value, and while it may be hard to measure, there is no
categorical reason for refusing to approximate a sum by way of taxation or
rates. An analogous argument can be made with respect to those who
benefit directly from subsidies - the travelling public - in terms of "consumers' surplus", the extra benefit of the subsidy to actual consumers,
calculated upon the basis of the financial value consumers place upon the
services over and above the sum that they pay. If the overall surplus for
consumers and producers taken together exceeds loss, then it is economic
to subsidise costs that cannot be met out of revenue. Finally, the actual
motive or reason for the G.L.C. subsidy in its original form probably
approximates to a very basic theorem of welfare economics, marginal cost
pricing - pricing according to the extra cost of providing a specific unit of
service, once the capital and other costs of establishing a service have been
met. The marginal cost of providing an additional unit of transport carrying an extra passenger - is likely to be relatively low. Pricing at this
level will not cover costs, but it is equally arguable that it is an economically more efficient and desirable use of resources than raising prices.
In conclusion, I am not concerned to argue anything more than that the
above concepts and analyses are relevant - they are all economic arguments pertinent to the reasonableness of providing a subsidy. It may well
be that the economic arguments against subsidies are more persuasive than
those in their favour, or that non-economic arguments could conclusively
override the economic arguments. My point is more general. The meaning
of the word "economic" is dependent upon its discursive context, and the
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Law Lords, in assuming that it. was inherently uneconomic to subsidise
London Transport , wholly excluded from consideration precisely those
economic concepts and analyses which could have thrown some light upon
the decision they were reviewing. In the last analysis, the patterns of
interdiscursive meaning evidenced in the judgments analysed are , I would
suggest, typical of the general form of legal justificatory argument. It is
only by critically analysing the details of the language and discursive
processes inherent within the legal text, that the preconstructions, preferred meanings, rhetoric and ideological dimension generally of legal discourse can be rationally challenged within the legal institution itself. In
reading the law, it is constantly necessary to remember the compositional,
stylistic and semantic mechanisms which allow legal discourse to deny its
historical and social genesis. It is necessary to examine the silences, absences and empirical potential of the legal text and to dwell upon the means
by which it appropriates the meaning of other discourses and of social
relations themselves , while specifically denying that it is doing so. It is, in
short, politically necessary to take seriously the character of law as a social
discourse.
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opposition of "associative field" to "syntagm". It was taken up in its modern form in A .
Martinet, Elements of General Linguistics (1964); and has received numerous modern
applications, including the dubious honour of that in F. Burton and P. Carlen, Official
Discourse (1979).
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Whereas Saussure distinguishes signifier and signified as the two elements of the lexical
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sign , later studies have elaborated l\ more complex, cross-cutting distinction between
denotation (lexical content/reference) and connotation (expression) . The seminal works
are L. Hjemslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (1%2) ; R. Barthes, Elements, op.
cit., pp. 89-94.
The structural opposition between metaphor and metonymy is a confusing one. It properly belongs to the last great rhetorical treatises of the 18th and 19th centuries (see, T.
Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, supra , ch. 5; C. Metz, op. cit., Pt. 4) but it received its
most original treatment in the work of R . Jakobson, Essai de Linguistique Generale
(1963) . It is confusing because it is treated as a formal distinction between axes of language
or of the signifying system within recent semiotic work, despite the fact that its derivation
is rhetorical and semantic. See , on this point , P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, op. cit.,
pp. 174-185; C. Metz, op. cit., pp. 152 ff.
Especially, G . Kalinowski , op. cit.; K. -Baldinger, Semantic Theory (1980) 42-61;
E. Landowski, op. cit. ,
E. Benveniste, Problems of General Linguistics (1971) ; " La forme et le sens dans le
language" (1967) Le Langage 27 ; R. Jakobson , Linguistics (1970) 455 ff.
Most famously his semiotic (logical) quadrants, best approached via A . J. Greimas and F.
Rastier, "The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints" (1973) Yale French Studies 86; for
introductory accounts, see J . Culler, Structuralist Poetics, op. cit. ch . 4; J . Larrain, The
Concept of Ideology (1979) 132-140. By far the most compelling account is to be found in
F. Jameson, The Political Unconscious (1981) 46-9, 121-27.
A . J . Greimas, Semiotique et Sciences Socia/es, op. cit., p. 79: "our pursuit over a number
of years, of a method (semiotic) of semantic analysis would have failed if its procedures
were not applicable to the elucidation of any discourse; if the models proposed were not
capable of providing an account of the modes of production , of existence and of functioning of any text whatsoever. "
Ibid. , pp. 90-4.
Ibid., pp. 88--90.
Ibid., p. 91.
Ibid., p. 92.
I do not intend any substantive distinction between sociolinguistics and discourse analysisvarious perspectives and traditions run across both fields of study . The principal works
include B. Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control (1971); P. Gigliopoli (ed.), Language and
Social Context (1972); V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973) ;
M.A.K. Halliday, Language as Social Semiotic (1978); R . Fowler et al, Language and
Control (1979); Hudson , Sociolinguistics (1979); R. Fowler, Literature as Social Discourse
(1981); T. Pateman, "Linguistics as a branch of critical theory" (1981) 14/15 U.E.A. Papers
in Linguistics 1; M. Bakhtin , The Dialogic Imagination (1982) ; M. Gurevitch et al. (eds.) ,
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and P. Walton (eds.), Language, Image, Media (1983); M. Pecheux, Language, Semantics
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Investigating English Style (1969) ch . 2. ; P. Carlen , Magistrates Justice (1976) ; J. M .
Atkinson and P. Drew, Order in Court (1979) ; W. L. Bennett and M . S. Feldman,
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Burton and P. Carlen , Official Discourse (1979) ; W. O'Barr, Linguistic Evidence (1982).
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(1981) 101-13; T. Eagleton, Literary Theory (1983) 194-218; P. de Mann, Allegories of
Reading (1979) ch. 1, 5-6; J. Kristeva, Desire in Language (1982) ch. 1; M. Pecheux , op. cit.,
Pts. 1, 2; M. Foucault, The Order of Things (1970) 302-344.
See , F. Nietzsche, Early Greek Philosophy and other Essays (1908) 180 ff. ; P. de Mann , op.
cit. , pp. 105 ff.
Especially , V . N . Volosinov, op cit., Pt . 1; and under the pseudonymofM . Bakhtin , op. cit. ,
ch. 4; R. Fowler, op. cit., ch . 2.
z. Harris, Discourse Analysis Reprints (1967) 7; for more recent definitions of the discipline,
see G . Brown and G. Yule , Discourse Analysis (1983) ; M. Stubbs, Discourse Analysis
(1983).
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V. Volosinov, op. cit., p . 20ff.
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Ibid., p. 401 . I cannot here enter into the linguistic details of such an account of meaning.
V. N. Volosinov elaborates a useful typology of speech forms according to the contexts of
group and class interaction. His point is that all signs are ideologically saturated or "multiaccentuaf' and that the accent or meaning which prevails is the object and outcome of struggle
between differently oriented sign users, the product of group and class conflict aimed at
winning credibility for specific accents, interests, meanings and purposes. See V. N.
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the concepts of " register" , " discursive process" and "topic transformation" to depict a
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M. Bakhtin, op. cit. , p. 264 ff; R. Fowler, op. cit., p. 111 ff.
The term hermeneutic - meaning little more than speaker's intention or purposiveness
(Verstehen) - is first used in P.M.S. Hacker and J . Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society
(1977) ch. l ; while its more recent currency derives from D. N. MacCormick, Legal
Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) ch. 8; D. N . MacCormick, H. L.A. Hart. Aside from
sources already adverted to in terms of Hart's own work, and the extremely useful commentaries of M . S. Moore, see H. L. A. Hart "Signs and Words" (1952) 2 Philosophical
Quarterly 59, for a highly telling account of communication in terms of intention and
illocution.
The primary source for this slogan is usually taken to be J . L. Austin , Philosophical Papers
(1%2); J. L. Austin, How to do things with words (1962) . For a criticism of this derivation,
see G. Sampson, Schools of Linguistics (1980).
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1967) paras. 23-24, 49 , 199-200.
Generally, see P . Ricoeur, op. cit., for an interesting commentary upon the linguistics (lack
of) of the Oxford School. Also, E . Gellner, Words and Things (2nd. ed. 1980).
H . L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) 4-6, 121-132, 233, 249; Definition and Theory
(1953); "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) Harvard Law Review
589.
For J. L. Austin's " linguistic phenomenology', seeJ. L. Austin , Philosophical Papers (1962)
182 ff; on "illocution", ibid., p. 99 ff.
This is most evident in Ch. Perelman, Logique Juridique (1976) 108, 132, 162-3, 173.
On which point, see Z. Bankowski and G. Maher, "Ordinary Language and Judicial
Discretion" (1981) 12 Rechtstheorie 1; T . Mathieson, Law, Society and Political Action
(1980) 89-lll, 140-145.
Particularly, P. Carlen , Magistrates Justice (1976) pp. 18-38, 98-127; W. O'Barr, Linguistic
Evidence (1982) 61-91, appendix l ; M. Cain , " The General Practice Lawyer and the Client:
Towards a Radical Conception" in The Sociology of the Professions 1983; eds. R. Dingwall
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upon similar themes, see J . M . Atkinson and P. Drew, Order in Court (1979) ch. 1, 2.
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Language and Women 's Place (1975); J . B . Elshtain , "Feminist Discourse and its Discontents: Language, Power and Meaning" (1982) 7 Signs 603 ; K. McKluskie , "Women's
Language and Literature" (1983) Feminist Review 51 ; the classic study is D . Spender, Man
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